This paper deals with the role of the State Owned enterprises (SOEs) in innovation processes. Only a few studies focus on the contribution SOEs as companies might give to produce new knowledge and technological innovation. We argue, however, that SOEs are a pillar of the innovation process and we explore conditions that can make SOEs very effective. Through two indepth case studies in two different industries (STMicroelectronics in the semiconductor and Thales Alenia Space in the space industry) we illustrate how SOEs can contribute to innovation by exploring new opportunities and recombining different sources of knowledge. We highlight the conditions that can make exploration and recombination possible. We also highlight the ability of the two companies to change their boundaries through a continuous wave of agreements, mergers and acquisitions. This way, they were able to expand beyond their domains in a way that matched the evolution of their original industries.
Introduction
State-owned enterprises (henceforth SOEs) remain an economic pillar in several mature and developing countries (Christiansen 2011; Kowalski et al. 2013; Girma, Gong, and Görg 2009; Gershman, Bredikhin, and Vishnevskiy 2016) . Their presence and impact vary over time. SOEs reached their peak at the end of the 1970s, when they accounted for approximately 7% of GDP in developed countries, 12% in developing non-socialist countries, and 90% in planned economies (Bernier 2014; Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014) . Despite the subsequent wave of privatization, SOEs still have a considerable impact. SOEs account for a large share of market capitalization, investment and employment and remain central in key industries, such as utilities and infrastructures (Clò et al. 2016) .
Our overall goal in this paper is to examine the impact of SOEs on innovation processes and technology development. The recent literature has celebrated the role of states in enabling innovation. Supporters of the 'entrepreneurial state', for example, argue that the state guides the 'technoeconomic process' (Mazzucato 2014, 8) . According to this view, most of the radical innovations that 'have fueled the dynamics of capitalism -from railroads to the Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals -depend upon capital-intensive, "entrepreneurial" investments pioneered by the state' (Mazzucato 2013, 3) . However, SOEs are barely considered in this debate, and their contribution to innovation processes is, in our opinion, widely underestimated.
We suspect this underestimation is more likely due to a gap in the existing literature than to a lack of data and information. Although the existing literature offers robust and convincing theoretical reasons to support public financing of research and invention, it assumes that public backing occurs indistinguishably. Obviously, financing research and invention through a research center, an academic department, or a company is not the same. Arguably, SOEs present specific features that make them appropriate and possibly preferable to available alternatives.
The first goal of our paper is to investigate how SOEs performed their role in innovation processes. To this end, we revise the existing literature on SOEs and relate it to the ability to access and exploit multiple knowledge sources. Our thesis is that SOEs are knowledge-explorer agents. The argument is that SOEs often go beyond their specific value chains, search and access new technologies, acquire technical capabilities, and implement innovation in products and processes precisely because they explore unknown territories. Furthermore, their distinct ability is to match apparently distant and divergent knowledge bases in novel combinations to give rise to renewed company configurations.
The second goal of our paper is to investigate the conditions under which such exploration can be successful. SOEs are public and must comply with several possible requests from shareholders and stakeholders. For example, SOEs might be asked to balance conflicting demands, such as preserving the workforce and improving economic results; have limited degrees of freedom due to political vetoes and binding regulations; and be at risk of divestiture as a result of privatization waves and so on.
In this perspective, our study is exploratory and based on two case studies of FrenchItalian companies: STMicroelectronics in the semiconductor industry and Thales Alenia Space in the aerospace industry. Both companies emerged from a long and complex process and were able to cope with severe environmental jolts. STMicroelectronics and Thales Alenia Space are good examples of the role SOEs can play. They both offer significant insights and suggest possible invariants that might help states accomplish a leading role in innovation processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the literature on SOEs and discuss their specific features in innovation processes in light of the economics of knowledge. In the third section, we analyze the two case studies. In the last section, we draw conclusions and offer suggestions for future research.
Literature review

State-owned enterprises
An SOE is 'any corporate entity recognised by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership' (OECD 2015, 14) . Despite liberalization and political pressures, SOEs remain relevant in the world economy (Guriev and (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Shleifer 1998; Ramaswamy 2001) . However, even though SOEs have a widespread reputation of poor economic efficiency, there is actually no full support of the hypothesis that firm performance depends upon ownership control, whether private, public, or privatized (Boardman and Vining 1989; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001) . More recently, however, scholars have found that management culture, legislation, political goals, and competition have a larger negative impact than state ownership on SOE efficiency (Victor, Hults, and Thurber 2011; Belloc 2014) . Third, market forces and selection mechanism do not affect SOEs the same way they affect private companies. Due to their social and mixed goals, SOEs are more likely to get shielded from possible failure. States might continue supporting SOEs even though they perform poorly. Accordingly, SOEs are less prone to react to market incentives and therefore may be resistant to change and innovation (Levy and Spiller 1994; Aghion, van Reenen, and Zingales 2009) .
Although the reasons why SOEs exist and performance issues remain central, two other issues have emerged recently. The first issue is the comparative political economic perspective of SOEs, as suggested by Millward (2011) , who explored at large the relationship between states and companies (including SOEs). He found that for a long period, public policies in Western Europe aimed to ensure national cohesion and external protection more than economic growth and welfare. The second issue concerns the government-firm interaction. Scholars argue that the effectiveness of specific policies (e.g. those supporting the creation of global players) depends upon appropriate co-ordination mechanisms and proper incentives (Colli, Mariotti, and Piscitello 2014) . Governments act not only as rule-setters but also as strategists with long-term goals. The key element is the alignment of interests between states and companies with the emergence of coalitions that are relatively stable over time. These coalitions would make policies effective. The third issue is the role played by the state in innovation processes.
Soes and innovation
Since Arrow's seminal contribution, there are good theoretical reasons to acknowledge that, to a considerable extent, research and invention ought to be financed by governments or 'some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss-criteria' (Arrow 1962, 623) . It is no surprise that 'this has always happened to a certain extent' thanks to efforts by research centers, universities, and individuals (Arrow 1962, 623) . The role played by the government goes beyond basic research and covers several stages of the innovation process. For example, the state supports entrepreneurs in the U.S. through the Small Business Administration (SBA); encourages start-ups through publicly funded incubators, as in Israel; directly invests in innovative companies through specific funds, as in the case of Finland (Mazzucato 2016) ; and so on.
That states and governments are key actors in the innovation process is indisputable. They invest a considerable amount of resources and are often involved in adopting new technologies and processes (OECD 2015) . Available evidence -although largely anecdotal -confirms that breakthrough innovation can also occur in the public sector (Sahni, Wessel, and Christensen 2013) . Paradoxically, successful innovations in the public sector often occur in the presence of financial constraints and budget cuts, suggesting that the public sector is a major source of innovation and a possible catalyst for new solutions.
The literature on the role of governments in innovation processes is extensive, but this is not the case for the specific role played by SOEs. Empirical research on the link between SOEs and innovation is scant and mostly centers on the role played at the macro level by government-linked companies in newly developed countries. At a more micro level, scholars have investigated specific issues such as knowledge spillovers from SOE activity (Molas-Galart and Tang, 2006, Munari, Oriani, and Sobrero 2010; Musacchio and Staykov 2011) , inquired about the roadmapping abilities of SOEs to implement technological forecasting (Gershman, Bredikhin, and Vishnevskiy 2016; Vishnevskiy, Meissner, and Karasev 2015) , and explored their absorptive capacity (Li, 2011) .
The role of soes in innovation
The recent literature has re-evaluated the role played by SOEs, suggesting that their impact is much more relevant than previously assessed. According to this view, SOEs are a powerful mechanism of knowledge governance (Antonelli et al., 2014) . The assumption is that knowledge spillovers are not all alike and that necessary, complementary conditions must be in place to leverage their full potential. More specifically, knowledge spillovers' effects depend upon the characteristics of the source, the perspective of the user and the context in which knowledge spillovers occur. According to Antonelli et al. (2014) , SOEs were excellent sources of knowledge spillovers in the second wave of Italian industrialization that occurred in the second part of the 20th century. SOEs played a central role in generating and spreading new knowledge. They 'were able to feed the fast rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth of the system with the provision of strong and far reaching spill-overs carrying high quality knowledge externalities' (Antonelli et al., 2014, 44) .
Several factors explain the overall contribution of SOEs to the production and spread of new knowledge. First and foremost, SOEs rely on an institutional mix of property rights (e.g. in Italy, IRI, a public holding company, controlled shares traded on the Stock Exchange), where public property parallels an entrepreneurial style typical of private companies. Second, SOEs have enjoyed significant managerial autonomy. The state encouraged long-term R&D projects. A national research system with labs in different domains was established, favoring the dissemination of high-quality knowledge. Third, and more important, SOEs act as an open R&D system, performing inhouse research commissioned from outside while contracting projects externally. SOEs operate as an interface between scientific research, through hundreds of projects with external structures, and the generation of new technological knowledge, accomplished through licenses, technology agreements, and joint-ventures with foreign multinationals.
Other scholars have highlighted the role of SOEs as instruments of innovation policy, suggesting that an analysis at the firm level should be accompanied by a macro-level governance perspective. Tõnurist and Karo (2016) argue that SOEs provide an institutional setting in which private incentives and risk-taking behavior coexist with public incentives and long-term orientation. This double-faced nature and the ability to combine public and private roles in a single organization make SOEs good candidates not only for producing and disseminating new knowledge but also for coordinating and directing other actors needed to nurture a national innovation system. In this way, SOEs are conceived as both independent innovators that pursue specific long-term innovation strategies and policy instruments within a larger policy mix that can vary according to broader factors.
Scholars have recently started investigating how SOEs perform their role in innovation activities. The rationale of SOEs in innovation activities is justified by the more immediate feedbacks they can transfer to innovation policy makers as well as their risktaking/experimentation capabilities (Tõnurist and Karo 2016) ; within a framework that emphasizes the co-evolution of micro-level managerial capabilities and macro-level policy capacities.
Purpose of the research
We argue that SOEs promote and sustain innovation processes thanks to their combinatorial capability. Combinatorial capability is the outcome of two different, intertwined activities. The first activity is the acquisition of knowledge. Acquisition of knowledge is essentially a process of searching, screening, and recognizing existing pieces of knowledge, both from internal sources, either tacit or formal, and external knowledge derived from interactions with users and owners (Cassiman and Veugelers 2006; Metcalfe 2007; Arthur 2009 ). The acquisition of knowledge in the case of SOEs has largely occurred through both internal and external sources, as in the case of IRI (Antonelli et al., 2014) . The managers of IRI operative companies enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. Autonomy and managerial skills made a broad search for new knowledge possible both from internal and external sources. These features supported the exchange of both codified and tacit knowledge from technological domains that in principle were quite distant from each other. Such an exchange requires absorptive capacity and learning abilities (Nooteboom 2000; Gilsing et al. 2008 ) between SOEs and private companies. The second activity is the recombination of knowledge. Recombination of knowledge occurs when an organization has access to the internal and external knowledge repositories of other organizations and is able to interact with these sources on a continuous basis. This recombination depends upon the quality and variety of knowledge sources (Graf and Krüger 2011; Arikan and Knoben 2014) .
However, the conditions under which the acquisition and recombination of knowledge become possible remain unclear. Clearly, SOEs can have different degrees of freedom in exploring unfamiliar, unknown domains. However, permission to explore does not necessarily imply an ability to discover new valuable knowledge and extract value from it. Scholars have suggested that two general conditions are necessary. The first condition implies effective coordination mechanisms between SOEs and government/state agencies. These mechanisms can have a relevant impact on innovation processes (Colli, Mariotti and Piscitello, 2014) . Effective coordination mechanisms can facilitate the transmission of information from companies to policy makers. They can also produce faster, more appropriate decisions at both levels. The second condition is the alignment of several actors as managers of SOEs and members of institutional committees and government. Alignment occurs when key decision-makers have a common vision and shared values. Alignment emerges over time, producing (relatively) stable coalitions.
We agree that the role played by SOEs in innovation processes depends upon decisions made at the company level and policy guidelines set at the central level by a dominant coalition. However, 'more detailed case studies of the few success stories of SOEs as innovation entrepreneurs', as suggested by Tõnurist and Karo (2016, 641) , can shed light on how and under what conditions SOEs perform their role in innovation processes.
Analysis
Data and methods
To address the issues of how SOEs perform their role in innovation processes and under what conditions they succeed as knowledge-explorer agents, we relied on a casestudy approach (Yin 2017) . A case-study approach aims to understand the dynamics of single settings and permits the generation of new theories (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Dul and Hak 2008) . This is precisely our case: we use case-study methodology to observe and describe a phenomenon, as prescribed for a scientific theory-building approach (McCutcheon and Meredith 1993; Handfield and Melnyk 1998; Meredith 1998) .
Our study features two case studies: STMicroelectronics in the semiconductor industry and Thales Alenia Spazio in the aerospace industry. We selected these two cases because they permit the observation of the process of interest (Pettigrew 1990) . In fact, they are SOEs that have proved to be innovative in turbulent industries. Most of the SOEs that have been analysed so far fall short in this respect, either because they were active in mature and traditional industries or were highly ineffective (Shleifer 1998; Ramaswamy 2001; Choi, Lee, and Williams 2011) . Literature is riddled with SOEs that were not able to cope with challenging innovative goals (Aghion, van Reenen, and Zingales 2009; Belloc 2014) . STMicroelectronics and Thales Alenia Spazio both represent extreme situations, precisely the setting 'allowing one to gain certain insights that other organizations would not be able to provide' (Siggelkow 2007, 20) .
In our analysis we combined different data-collection methods: first, we reviewed all existing information and reports about the two companies; second, we enjoyed limited access to archival data; third, we conducted in teams several interviews with top managers of the companies. 1 We triangulated the primary data, which offers crucial facts, with the secondary data, which helps provide information on contextual key issues, from a multi-perspective point of view (Eisenhardt 1989; Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008) .
STMicroelectronics and Thales Alenia Space are illustrative of exploration processes undertaken in different high-tech industries, where they have both emerged as leading companies. We have organized the two case studies in common chapters: background, knowledge acquisition and recombination, and company restructuring. Of its 46.500 employees, 7.400 work in 16 R&D departments. ST has 80 sales and marketing offices in 35 countries, 11 main manufacturing sites and more than 100.000 customers worldwide.
2 Table 1 reports the main financial indicators for ST (see Table A1 in appendix for a longer analysis).
ST is the outcome of repeated mergers involving private and public companies that occurred both in Italy and France, as portrayed in Figure 1 SGS-Thomson (renamed STMicroelectronics in 1998) was formed to overcome the market's limited size in France and Italy and the power of American, i.e. Intel and Motorola, and Japanese, i.e. NEC, semiconductor producers.
The two original companies were already a combination of several technological capabilities, from telecommunications to electronics.
In Italy, SGS, which was founded in 1972, combined the assets of a private and a state-owned company. In France, Thomson Semiconductors merged several private companies with a state-owned company (Compagnie General de Telegraphie sans fil) and the American company Mostek, which was acquired from United Technologies in 1985 (Von Tunzelmann 1999, 144) .
The economic and competitive conditions of SGS were very poor when, in 1980, Dr. Pistorio, previously vice president of marketing at Motorola and with a long experience in manufacturing, was appointed CEO. SGS was about to go bankrupt: losses accounted for more than 20% of revenue, manufacturing was highly ineffective, and the organization was out of control:
'. . . when I first arrived in the Catania plant, I noticed that all managers started working no sooner than 9 a.m. . . .. and went home for lunch . . .This was unconceivable to me . . . so I enforced the 8 a.m. rule'
Knowledge acquisition and recombination
In the 1980s, SGS went through a severe reorganization that cut costs, rationalized manufacturing and increased productivity. According to highly seasoned several top managers, Dr. Pistorio was successful as he brought a new vision, changed the culture of the company, hired a new team and designed a road map to make the company a key player in the market. In 1983, SGS was profitable for the first time in fourteen years. However, SGS was too small (in 1980, its revenue was 50 million €, ranking 24 th worldwide in the semiconductor industry) and could not be competitive. Dr. Pistorio clearly realized that only a large company could fill the gap with competitors and proposed to his shareholders a merger of SGS with Thomson Semiconductors. As he remembers:
'. . . when I was hired my original assignment was simply to limit losses. . . but I was convinced that we needed a new, appropriate strategy. . . in the second half of the '80's it became clear that the industry was going to be much more concentrated, as a huge amount of financial resources was needed to finance R&D and competition was already global. The two industries in Italy and French were small and unable to get a critical mass on their own. . . besides the two companies were symmetrical: Thomson semiconductor had poor economic results and limited debt. SGS, on the contrary, was profitable, but had huge debts. . . '
The negotiation was not simple: shareholder agreements forced the new company to have similar numbers of employees in France and in Italy and to equally invest in both countries. On the board of Directors, French and Italian government appointed three Directors each, whereas three others were independent. Dr. Pistorio -the architect of the merger -was appointed sole administrator of the new company. Despite the constraints imposed by the shareholder agreements, 4 he enjoyed a high degree of freedom in designing the new structure and in setting ambitious goals. His relationship with the shareholders remained quite solid but not binding: Dr. Pistorio had weekly meetings with Mr. Prodi, who enabled coordination with the French government.
Company restructuring
To become one of the key players in the industry, SGS Thomson raised fresh capital from its shareholders, increased its average investment in R&D from 12% to 20% of total revenue, opened up new plants in US to serve the American market and -most importantly -reorganized all manufacturing. SGS Thomson experienced steady growth in its market share. The merger between SGS and Thomson Semiconductors was one of the most remarkable in the industry and has been deemed a case of success (Coriat and Lucchini 1995; Cinici 2013 Fresh capital injection supported the company's growth, which occurred both internally through investments in tangible assets and human capital and externally through acquisitions, alliances and cooperative partnerships (see Table 2 ).
Acquisitions included the semiconductor and microprocessor divisions of Inmos in U.K., Nortel in Canada, Alcatel in France, and Genesis Microchip in the US. Alliances involved three joint ventures in memory applications, mobile and wireless. ST also signed long-term agreements with twelve private leading companies in four key industries (automotive, computer hardware, electronics goods, and telecommunications) accounting for nearly 50% of the company's sales (Steve 2004) . ST signed cooperative partnerships at both the central and local levels. For example, ST engaged with Apogee -an American specialist in amplifier technology -to form a partnership aimed at 'an interactive and evolving learning process based on a mutual recognition of the opportunities for innovative synergies between the two parties' (Christensen 2006) . ST also relied heavily on cooperative partnerships at the local level. For example, an analysis of 52 R&D projects performed in an ST subsidiary over the period 1998-2003 showed a large use of cooperative partnership agreements with universities (19), research centers (11), and firms (22) (Cassiman, Di Guardo, Valentini, 2009 ).
ST's network of collaboration goes beyond industrial partnerships. For example, in Italy, it signed agreements with University of Catania and Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa (SSSUP). In Catania, the partnership with the local university aimed to train personnel for its facility in Sicily (Cassar 2002 ). The partnership with Sant'Anna involves common research in bio-robotics, smart systems, and microelectronics (SSSUP 2011).
ST was successful in executing a 'comprehensive up-front strategy' involving alliances and acquisitions in an open-innovation fashion (Christensen, Olesen, and Kjaer 2005, 1546) . The competitive advantage of ST is in discovering, accessing, mobilizing, and leveraging knowledge from a global network of localized sources (Doz, Santos, Williamson, 2001 ). The top management of ST, initially Dr. Pistorio, was able to manage an internal network of geographically dispersed 'micro' units, each with its own specific assets and culture (Pistorio 2011, 207-208) . ST combined a strategy of specialization with a continuous organizational redesign, 'aiming at taking advantage from the most up-to-date experiences about present sources and criteria of innovation and competitively' (Coriat and Lucchini 1995, 151) .
Since its foundation, ST has focused great attention on the management of intellectual property, thanks to the inspiring direction of Dr. Pistorio, who brought to the company a new vision on intellectual assets he had developed in his previous experience in U.S. In Europe, patents were not considered highly relevant, and it took a considerable amount of time to set an adequate management process to protect intellectual capital.
Today, ST owns approximately 17.000 patents and patent applications, including approximately 5.600 originating from Italy. Figure 2 offers detailed information on the trend of first filings over the period 1990-2017.
Analyzing ST patents' portfolio, three different time periods, corresponding to different strategies, emerge. The first time period (approximately 1990-2000) can be labelled as the patent rush. As Mr. Palella and Mariani remember, 'at that time patenting was perceived as increasingly important, and we did our best to patent as much as possible. We were not super selective, as it was the rough number of patents that counted'. Patents were mainly intended as a defensive tool and as a credible threat to competitors. The second time period (approximately 2001-2010) marked a radical change as ST rationalized its patenting activity, mainly for budget and sustainability reasons. Rationalization meant a thorough, long-term cost-benefit analysis of the patent portfolio according to a technological perspective. It also implied a revision of patent application procedures: for example, filing at EPO (European Patent Office) -once common practice -was discouraged for cost reasons. In the third period (approximately 2011 on), two main changes occurred. First, the internal process was revised according to a business logic instead of a regional one. Second, ST has established a new internal group with financial expertise, which is in charge of extracting value from patents that are not strategic.
Thales alenia space
3.3.1. Background Twenty years ago (in 1997), the Cassini-Huygens mission started its journey to the planet Saturn. The orbiter Cassini concluded its exploration of Saturn in April 2017, and it is currently expected to dive into the planet and be destroyed in its atmosphere. The probe Huygens landed on Saturn's moon Titan in January 2005 and has since sent data back to Earth, including 350 pictures of the moon's surface. The mission took over 25 years and is now close to conclusion. It has been one of the major space scientific programs in decades. Many countries are participating in the mission, with greater effort from the space agencies of the USA (NASA), Europe (ESA), and Italy (ASI). Enterprises from France and Italy have been particularly involved in the development of the spacecraft. French Aérospatiale was the prime contractor for assembling the probe and the scientific equipment, while the Italian Space Agency was in charge of the radio Figure 2 . ST, first filings at worldwide level, 1990-march 2018 (N = 18,166) .
Source: courtesy of STMicroelectronics.
antenna, the Visible and Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (VIMS), and the radio-science subsystem for Cassini (Asi, Cassini-Huygens, 2017) Table 3 offers a view of the Thales Alenia Space's key financial indicators (see Table A2 in appendix for a longer analysis).
Knowledge exploration and acquisition
At its creation, the company had extensive experience in several lines of business, from electronics to aeronautics, which was instrumental to the design, assembly, and operation of an integrated space system (Tornincasa et al. 2008 ). On the French side, Alcatel Space merged the space activities of the parent company Alcatel-a world leader in telecommunications and network equipment founded in 1876-with the satellite business of aerospace company Aérospatiale in 1998. Then, Alcatel Space reached a cooperation agreement with Thomson-CSF, an electronic company predecessor of the Thales group. Both Aérospatiale and Thomson-CSF were state-owned companies. Just a few years later, in 2001, Alcatel bought Thales' stake for €795 million (Thales, 2016, 177) . The Space division of Alcatel was transferred again to Thales in 2006, which assumed the new name Thales Alenia Space. Thales followed the partial privatization of Thomson in 1998 and today operates mainly in the three areas of aerospace, defense, and electronics. It is a world leader in traveling wave tube technology, which is fundamental for telecommunications satellites.
On the Italian side, Finmeccanica -recently rebranded as Leonardo -was the holding company for the mechanical industries of the state-owned IRI group. Finmeccanica operated in several industries since 1948, including automotive through Alfa Romeo; energy, transportation, and engineering through Ansaldo; and Aerospace through Aerospazio. Finmeccanica organized its business around aerospace and defense during the 1980s with the sale of Alfa Romeo and the acquisition of the electronic company Selenia, itself owned by IRI (Felice 2010) . Aeritalia was the result of pursuing IRI's aeronautic business Aerfer, which integrated in 1969 with the private firm FiatAviazione, which was created to consolidate national capabilities in the industry. Aeritalia subsequently acquired from IRI the electronic companies Laben, Proel, Space Control, and Space Software Italia.
5 Selenia started in Naples in 1961 as a partnership of Italian Edison and Finmeccanica with American Raytheon. Selenia was built around competences in radar production and was the operator of three small companies aggregated by IRI as part of Finmeccanica, which then contributed their capabilities to the partnership (Zamagni 2009 ). Alongside Aeritalia, Selenia became the main contractor of the Italian space program and among the most important in the European Space Agency (Landoni 2016) .
The consequences were twofold. First, Selenia spun off its space activities in 1982 with the formation of Selenia Spazio, Second, IRI arranged a further consolidation of the industry in 1990, this time aimed precisely at space technologies through the merger of Aeritalia and Selenia to create Alenia.
6 Alenia Spazio operates in the satellite production and operations and space infrastructure manufacturing businesses 7 and has been an active partner in many international partnerships, including the International Space Station.
Company restructuring
The merger consolidated a wide range of technological capabilities. However, at the time of the merger, the government-as a major stakeholder-had no clear vision of the technological bases of the firms and did not arrange their consolidation according to an industrial plan:
'Technological capabilities were relocated in other companies according to firms' combinatorial opportunity; for example, pieces of Selenia concerning electronics for helicopters in Agusta and for satellites in Alenia.' 8 Instead, the companies, particularly the holding company Finmeccanica, were able to search for and collect the technological capabilities on sale within the public enterprises. The management of Finmeccanica had sufficient free rein to recombine firms and entire industries according to its own view, without coping with political pressure. In this respect, the CEO of Finmeccanica Fabiano Fabiani (1985 -1995 , who was appointed by Romani Prodi, had a leading role in the transformation of the group's core business in aerospace.
9 Internationalization of the SOE was paired with its corporatization (Landoni 2018) . The subsequent merger with the French group Alcatel was mainly supported by the management with the aim of a nearly equal partnership rather than minority participation in a pan-European (i.e. Eads) or US group, as stated by former CEO Guarguaglini (2007) .
Today's company is a combination of technologies inherited from enterprises barely related to space (see Figure 3) . Considerable effort was required to reach full and systemic capabilities in space technologies. The origins can be traced to distant yet complementary businesses. What is peculiar in this case is that, despite both companies and states pursuing a long-term strategy, there was not a clear understanding of space technologies as the ultimate goal of that strategy at its inception. Thales Alenia Space operates in several business lines. It is among the world leaders in the design and production of satellites and payloads for telecommunications and navigation and is the world leader in radar altimeters for operational space oceanography. It also operates in Earth observation and scientific exploration of space and produces orbital infrastructure and space transport. Thales Alenia Space is one of the major contractors of the International Space Station (ISS) and has delivered more than half of its pressurized volume. It posted revenues of 2.4 billion euros in 2016 and has more than four thousand employees (see Table A2 in appendix).
Discussion
The two cases shed light on the active role of SOEs in exploring and combining knowledge sources. Relevant to our discussion is that, despite the distance among the sources of knowledge, their combination led to the emergence of new technologies and a novel industry (i.e. space) as result of the process of knowledge exploration.
STMicroelectronics is an example of an organization free to explore industrial solutions beyond its firm and national boundaries while at the same time anchored to a public mission. The public mission was the development of a semiconductor industry in Europe. This industry has been pivotal in multiple fields, from telecommunication to computers. Notwithstanding the political effort, the development was not without difficulties; for examples, the cultural distance between a large French company and a small US firm caused the failure of the integration of Mostek in Thomson (Doz 1987) . ST overcame cultural distance when the management was able to benefit from greater autonomy, as stated by Pasquale Pistorio, the first CEO of ST. Although the acquisition of Mostek was not successful, ST later based its growth on a worldwide network of research centers. The management of diversity has been essential for innovation, the real key in explaining success and failure (Pistorio, 2011) . ST enjoyed considerable autonomy in exploring innovative paths, and its managers have positively exploited the different components of the company. The exploration of distant knowledge sources is even more evident in the case of Thales Alenia Space. At its inception, space technologies simply did not exist in their present definition. The few aerospace capabilities then available were a not sufficient base to start the space industry in either Italy or France. The government guided the formation of the industry from a novel combination of aerospace, electronics, and telecommunications technologies. In France, Alcatel and Aérospatiale were SOEs in the telecommunication and aerospace industries, respectively, and merged to form AlcatelSpace. Similarly, in Italy, Aeritalia and Selenia were SOEs in aerospace and electronics. The latter enjoyed a collaboration with US-based Raytheon to develop its radar activity. Eventually, the two Italian SOEs formed Alenia in 1990 on the basis of an industrial strategy strongly supported by management.
The further merger of the French and Italian SOEs was motivated by industrial reasons. Alcatel-Space and Alenia Spazio had already developed space technologies; however, the need for a greater market dimension and particularly the search for a greater synergy of activities prompted a further merger. Again, more than the governments, it was management that pushed for an integration of the two SOEs. As in the case of ST, state ownership did not prevent the exploration of technological complementarities in either foreign or different industries. Instead, state ownership was a common ground that eased integration. The governance and the composition of the stockholders of ST and TAS diverge from the ones where the State is the only shareholder. However, these features are quite common in Western countries and fit recent analysis (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014) .
The two cases highlight several invariants about the conditions necessary for SOEs to be innovative in new, emerging industries. First, the states and companies shared a common vision for the future of technological industries in Europe, a long-term object of industrial policy for both the semiconductor and the space technologies; and second, management had an autonomous and active role and, despite been aligned with the government, was granted free rein to run the company.
The first condition is the alignment between states and SOEs. The politically dominant coalition and top management shared a common vision about the future of high-tech industries. They had clear, long-term goals from an industrial policy perspective both in semiconductors and aerospace: leverage existing capabilities, gain access to needed resources, and become key players. This alignment allowed both ST and TAS to explore new territories well beyond their national domains. It also made possible acquiring access to new knowledge despite differences in industries, markets, and national identities. In this light, both SOEs have proved to be effective vehicles to acquire and import new technologies from foreign countries (Li, 2011) . The process of technological combination has proved to be effective in the case of ST, which operates in a competitive market of components for consumer electronics goods, as well as for TAS, which depends on demand strongly affected by public buyers.
The second condition enabling knowledge exploration and combination is the role of management. In both cases, managers were aligned with the politically dominant coalition as well as the long-term strategy. However, managers were largely autonomous and even able to affect the companies' strategy. The managers of ST and TAS played an entrepreneurial-like role instead of complying with short-term political interests, as is usually perceived in the case of SOEs. The managers suggested risk-taking initiatives, designed mergers and acquisitions that at that time were quite uncommon, and successfully led integration processes. This is mostly evident in the case of ST, where Dr. Pistorio was able to enact his own personal vision.
The third condition is the reconfiguration of property rights. In both cases, states diluted their shares and agreed to decrease control. This was a necessary step to comply with severely competitive conditions in both industries and to survive in highly concentrated environments. Both ST and TAS are the outcomes of long-lasting processes of reconfiguration. They emerged as national pre-existing SOEs merged. The boundaries of the two firms also subsequently changed. The growth of ST and TAS occurred both internally through huge investments in capital and labor and externally through the acquisition of new capabilities. The two cases we examined provide support for this possible distinguishing feature of SOEs (Cassiman, Di Guardo, and Valentini 2009) . For ST and TAS, growth occurred through several acquisitions. Significantly, the acquisitions did not follow a vertical integration strategy. ST and TAS went beyond their specific value chains to access new technologies. This occurred both horizontally and vertically, and as a result, ST and TAS have expanded well beyond their original activities.
The need to capitalize capabilities and resources spread across several different domains and to acquire a critical mass explains changes that occurred over a couple of decades. These changes were probably crucial for the survival of the two companies. Both ST and TAS survived and flourished thanks to their ability to explore new domains and to acquire and recombine innovative capabilities in a new evolving organization.
The contribution of our study suggests that three conditions can limit the risks of mismanagement that have affected so many SOEs around the world, e.g. IRI at the end of the century:
• the first condition is alignment between states and the top managers of SOEs. A common vision is essential for navigating difficult seas; • the second condition is the autonomy of expert managers, who should be empowered to propose long-term programs and to reconfigure the firm accordingly. The autonomy of expert managers is a prerequisite to avoid political intrusion; • the third condition is the ability to modify the SOE'S ownership structure and corporate governance to endow the SOE with more adequate resources.
Conclusion
SOEs were established in different times to reach a variety of objectives. Historical analysis and the economic literature offer a solid framework to understand their rationale and role (Millward 2011) . From an empirical perspective, SOEs continue to represent a key component of modern economies. This holds true in both newly developed countries as well as several Western economies, despite the privatization wave that occurred in the 1980s. A few exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. Tõnurist and Karo 2016), the vast majority of studies have not focused on the role of SOEs in innovation systems and technological development. This is quite surprising due to the increasing popularity of the 'entrepreneurial state' approach, which highlights the centrality of governments and public policies in sustaining and implementing innovation processes (Mazzucato 2013) . According to this approach, governments and public policies bear most of the risk. They invest in long-term, basic research, the results of which are available to private companies. Without the generous efforts of public institutions, private companies would not have been able to introduce breakthrough products. The case study of the iPhone has been purposely used to demonstrate the high indebtedness of private companies to public research. The entrepreneurial state approach, with the exception of public banks, does not consider SOEs a key component of the innovation process. In a significant number of countries, data tell a different story (OECD 2005) . Our study suggests that the role of the state should be evaluated from a more analytical perspective: the state can act as an entrepreneur -following the abovementioned approach -in different ways. Setting up SOEs is not the same as building research centers or other public initiatives. SOEs are companies. They can establish proper routines and organizational practices that are crucial for producing new knowledge and for innovation. SOEs are not all alike. The SOEs we have investigated do not comply with the 'national champion' model because they have been competing in open markets and have not 'enjoyed' national protectionism. To shed full light on the role of the state as entrepreneur, we need a thorough investigation of SOEs. As far as the innovation process is concerned, SOEs remain central from both an input and an output perspective. From an input perspective, SOEs account for a large share of R&D investments, and their R&D personnel represent a significant proportion of the human capital committed to innovation. From an output perspective, it is undisputable that SOEs contribute both to long-term research and commercially oriented research.
We argue that the existing literature has not paid sufficient attention to SOEs as specific means of promoting innovation processes. There are good reasons to believe that SOEs have played a pivotal role as far as research and innovation are concerned. Stmicroelectronics and Thales Alenia Space are just two examples of a wider phenomenon. Still, a large part of the existing literature represents SOEs as 'second best', arguing that SOEs are comparatively less efficient than privately owned enterprises (POEs) under either benevolent or malevolent governments (Belloc 2014) . Understanding the conditions under which SOEs contribute significantly to innovation processes -as in the cases we have examined -could be highly beneficial. We argue that a good alignment between SOEs' managers and political economic decision-makers is crucial. In the case of both Stmicroelectronics and Thales Alenia Space this alignment was fundamental to the continuous reconfiguration of the companies' boundaries. Autonomy of managers was also crucial. Managers of both companies enjoyed significant degrees of freedom in exploring new territories and were effective in establishing relationships with other companies. StMicrolectronics is highly illustrative in this respect: its management was fully supported in designing a merger that at that time was highly uncommon.
Our study has several limitations. The first limitation is that we could not perform a longitudinal analysis. A longitudinal analysis would be highly beneficial as it could shed more light on the evolution of SOEs in innovative, competing industries. It could also, for instance, provide more robust support for the side effects stimulated by SOEs. Existing research has highlighted that spill-overs of public research might be crucial in allowing start-up processes. However, it might be argued that the sheer presence of large innovative SOEs can produce other positive effects. SOEs can attract other companies to the same region and also support the birth of specific industrial districts. the second limitation is that, although two case studies can offer some insights, they are obviously not sufficient. We believe that there is a more general need to replicate and extend the investigation of SOEs and innovation.
We suggest looking for invariants that can explain the success and failure of SOEs. Our analysis suggests that SOEs should have a combinatorial capability. In addition to combining pieces of knowledge from different domains, SOEs also need to combine different organizational identities and establish adequate organizational practices within a sustainable organizational redesign. SOEs are not a homogeneous set of companies whose main hallmark is public ownership: they deserve longitudinal analysis and a thorough investigation of their evolutionary dynamics.
Finally, our research warns about the complexity of the innovation landscape. The innovation landscape cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy based on public intervention on the one hand and private firms on the other hand. Public intervention and private firms have different constituencies as far as basic knowledge and innovation are concerned. However, they are not homogeneous: public intervention occurs in different organizational ways that remain to be deeply examined. States support basic knowledge generation by financing universities, public research centers, and public-private long-term projects. SOEs are therefore a case in point that needs to be carefully examined.
